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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Civil War in Vineland
The nation of Vineland suffered through four years of dev-
astating civil war between the central government and three
ethnic groups that were seeking independence. (R. 1) In Sep-
tember 2001, the Vineland government and the three ethnic
groups finally signed a peace agreement. (R. 1) The warring
parties agreed to form a democratic government, with each eth-
nic group participating and sharing power. (R. 1) To support
this new government, the United Nations Security Council (the
"Security Council") authorized UNVINE to deploy five-hundred
military personnel and six-hundred civilian personnel to Vine-
land to verify cessation of the hostilities, to set up a security
zone for civilians and refugees, and to make preparations for
the forthcoming elections in the various regions. (R. 1)
The Secretary-General of the United Nations (hereinafter
the "U.N.") invited member States to contribute additional
forces and equipment necessary to carry out this mission. (R.
1) The nations of Katonia and Ridgeland accepted this invita-
tion, deploying soldiers and paratroopers to the UNVINE mis-
sion. (R. 1) However, the peace agreement failed when
ANVA, an insurgent group from the northern region of Vine-
land, broke away from the newly formed government in June
2002. (R. 1) ANVA was dissatisfied over the number of ANVA
seats in the new government, as well as its oil revenue shares
from oil deposits in its region. (R. 2)
Creation of the ICC
On 1 July 2002, the Statute of the ICC entered into force between
the States Parties to the Statute and empowered the Court to
prosecute and punish persons who committed genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity in the territory of States Par-
ties where the competent national courts are either 'unwilling' or
'not available' to exercise their jurisdiction. (R. 4)
Vineland is one of more than eighty-five Parties to the Statute
of the International Criminal Court (hereinafter "Rome Stat-
ute.") (R. 4) At the same time, at the U.N., the Katonia repre-
sentative was working to prevent the prosecution of its soldiers
in the International Criminal Court (hereinafter the "ICC" or
2005]
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"Court"). (R. 3) Katonia opposed the creation of the ICC and
sought to prevent the future prosecution of any of its soldiers
involved in any future conflicts. (See R. 3) Indeed, Katonia
threatened the Security Council that it would not participate in
the UNVINE mission or any future U.N. peacekeeping missions
unless the Security Council granted it immunity from prosecu-
tion by the ICC. (R. 3)
Retaliatory Attacks on a Civilian Population by
Katonia and Ridgeland Soldiers
"On 10 July 2002, unidentified... groups in [the] Vineland
[northern region] attacked UNVINE peacekeeping forces sta-
tioned outside Bridgetown. Ten Katonia soldiers and 15 Ridge-
land paratroopers were killed." (R. 5) In response to the
attack, "Katonia and Ridgeland decided to send an additional
200 paratroopers to assist their soldiers. They also launched a
retaliatory ten-day aerial bombing in the general area where
the attacks occurred. (R. 6) The bombing campaign destroyed
several ANVA training camps and killed many insurgents. (R.
% 6)
However, the bombing also inflicted severe damage on non-
military targets, including the destruction of thousands of acres
of farmland, as well as large quantities of crops and livestock.
(R. 6) Additionally, numerous unexploded bombs littered
roads and fields, posing severe danger to civilians on the
ground. (R. 6) The two-hundred additional paratroopers on
the ground cordoned off the area of the attacks and "conducted
house-to-house raids detaining approximately 50 men and 20
boys." (R. 6) Many families complained that the paratroopers
took personal property from their homes during the searches.
(R. 6) The detainees were taken to a detention compound
where they were observed in order to determine if any of them
were insurgents. (R. 6) Some detainees were subjected to tor-
ture in an isolated area of the camp. (R % 6)
"On 20 July 2002, acting on Vineland intelligence reports,
Katonia and Ridgeland ordered their paratroopers to bomb
ANVA headquarters. (R. 10) The Human Rights Monitors re-
ported that this bombing destroyed three villages, killing three
hundred civilians, including women and children, and seriously
injuring 550. (R. 1 10)
[Vol. 17:179
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The Attempt to Grant Immunity to Katonia Soldiers
From Prosecution in the ICC
Amidst carrying out the UNVINE peacekeeping operations
in the northern region of Vineland, the Security Council unani-
mously adopted Resolution 1234 (hereinafter the "Resolution")
on July 12, 2002. (R. 7) The Resolution gives a twelve-month
exemption from ICC prosecution to Vineland peacekeepers tak-
ing part in U.N. peacekeeping operations. (R. 7) The Resolu-
tion reads:
The Security Council
Acting Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Requests consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the
Rome Statute that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or
former officials or personnel from a contributing State not a
Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions relating to a
United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a
twelve-month period starting July 1, 2002 not commence or
proceed with investigation or prosecution of any such case, un-
less the Security Council decide otherwise. S.C. Res.1234,
21, (July 12, 2002).
Since Katonia was prepared to veto U.N. peacekeeping opera-
tions if not granted immunity, this resolution was viewed as a
concession to Katonia. (R. 8) Many States Parties to the ICC
viewed the Resolution as inconsistent with the Rome Statute
and as a modification of Article 16 of the Rome Statute. (R. 8)
In addition to pushing through the Resolution, Katonia
concluded what it called "Article 98 Agreements" with nations
in various regions of the world, including Vineland and Ridge-
land." (R. 9) In these bilateral agreements, the parties
agreed not to surrender Katonia's soldiers to the ICC without
Katonia's consent. (R. 9)
Capture of Katonia and Ridgeland Soldiers and
Attempts to Hold Them Responsible for Crimes
Committed During the Reprisal Campaign
On July 20, 2002, the day of the ANVA headquarters bomb-
ing, "ANVA captured three Katonia and two Ridgeland pilots
whose planes had encountered engine trouble and landed in a
nearby marsh." (R. 11) ANVA believed that these pilots en-
2005]
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gaged in the bombing missions that resulted in civilian fatali-
ties. (R. 11) Additionally, after the bombing ended, civilians
in the targeted area stormed a local police station, where four
Ridgeland military police were stationed as trainers and consul-
tants to the local police force. (R. 11) Several women recog-
nized the military police officers as the soldiers who had taken
their husbands and sons. (R. 1 11) As a result, the civilians
took the policemen prisoner. (R. 11a) The soldiers were later
handed over to the ANVA insurgents who were already holding
the five pilots. (R. l1b)
In response, Katonia and Ridgeland threatened further
military action if the captives were not immediately released.
(R. 12) The Secretary-General of the U.N. stepped in to de-
escalate the situation and sent his special representative to ne-
gotiate with ANVA. (R. 12) The Secretary-General's special
representative proposed two possible solutions to the ANVA tri-
bunal, which were to either try the pilots in a neutral third
country or to in the ICC at the Hague. (R. 12) Because of the
serious political and legal difficulties in finding a suitable third
country to try the soldiers, ANVA, under continuing threat of
immediate military reprisals by Katonia and Ridgeland, agreed
to surrender the soldiers to the ICC. (R. 12) In an official
statement, Vineland asserted that if did not intend to exercise
jurisdiction over the accused." (R. 13)
[Vol. 17:179
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The ICC should exercise jurisdiction over the accused. In-
vestigating and prosecuting the accused for the crimes commit-
ted corresponds with the Court's goal of putting an end to
impunity. Exercising jurisdiction over the accused fulfills the
jurisdictional requirements of the Rome Statute, is in accor-
dance with international principles of equity, and does not vio-
late any provision of the Resolution or the Rome Statute.
Defendants have committed crimes that violate the Rome
Statute and should be prosecuted accordingly. Defendants' ac-
tions clearly violate customary norms of international law, as
well as specific provisions of the Rome Statute. The ICC should
move forward with the prosecution of these defendants so that
they can be punished for their crimes. The ICC should take this
opportunity to set the precedent that peacekeeping forces are
bound by the dictates of international law in order to ensure
that they do indeed help bring peace to conflict-ridden regions
around the globe.
ARGUMENT
I. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT SHOULD
EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER THE ACCUSED IN
ORDER TO SERVE THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH
THE COURT WAS FOUNDED
Exercising jurisdiction over the accused is the only means
through which the objective of the ICC will be realized. Accord-
ingly, the Court should exercise jurisdiction over the accused for
the following reasons: 1) the crimes were committed on territory
subject to the ICC's jurisdiction, 2) Vineland, Katonia, and
Ridgeland are unwilling or unavailable to investigate the
crimes, 3) the Agreement between Vineland and Katonia does
not trump Vineland's obligations to the ICC, 4) equity dictates
the use of a neutral forum, and 5) the military actions in which
the accused participated were not part of U.N. peacekeeping op-
erations in Vineland.
The ICC's central objective is to "put an end to impunity" by
assuring that "the most serious crimes of concern to the inter-
national community as a whole [do] not go unpunished." Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court preamble, July 17,
20051
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1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; 37 I.L.M. 1002 [hereinafter "Rome Stat-
ute"]. To this end, States Parties to the Rome Statute are obli-
gated to cooperate with the ICC in its investigation and
prosecution of crimes and in the surrender of persons to the
Court under articles 86, 87, 89, and 90. See id, arts. 86-90.
A. Exercising Jurisdiction over the Accused Fulfills the
Jurisdictional Requirements of the Rome Statute
The ICC may exercise jurisdiction over specific crimes oc-
curring within the territory of a state party to the Rome Stat-
ute. See id., art. 12(2)(a). Since ICC jurisdiction is
"complementary to national criminal jurisdictions," in order for
the ICC to hear a case, the case must not currently be under
investigation or prosecution by any state having jurisdiction
over the accused, and there must not be any state, with compe-
tent national courts and having jurisdiction over the accused,
that is willing or available to carry out an investigation and
prosecution. Se id, arts. 1, 17.
The states having jurisdiction over the Katonian and
Ridgeland soldiers have demonstrated that they are unwilling
and unavailable to investigate and prosecute the accused. Since
the crimes were committed in Vineland territory, the accused
are also subject to Vineland jurisdiction. However, Vineland is-
sued an official statement that it would not investigate or prose-
cute the accused. (R. 13) Ridgeland and Katonia may also
exercise jurisdiction over their accused nationals, but they have
remained silent on the issue. As to ANVA jurisdiction, ANVA's
military tribunals are not official national tribunals, and are,
therefore, not complementary to ICC jurisdiction. Thus, even if
ANVA was willing to investigate and prosecute the accused, its
courts are not considered complementary to the ICC.
Surrendering the accused to the ICC is consistent with
Vineland's obligations to the ICC, as customary international
treaty law prescribes that states parties must put forth a good
faith effort to abide by the Rome Statute. Customary interna-
tional law obligates states parties to a treaty to make a good
faith effort to "refrain from acts which would defeat [its] object
and purpose." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts.
18, 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinaf-
[Vol. 17:179
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ter "Vienna Convention"]; see also Norwegian Loans, 1957
I.C.J. 9, 53.
Accordingly, "every treaty in force is binding upon the par-
ties to it" and is binding "upon each party in respect of its entire
territory." Vienna Convention, arts. 26, 29. A "violation of a
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or pur-
pose of the treaty" by a state party to the treaty constitutes a
material breach of that treaty. Id., art. 60(3).
Vineland and Katonia, which are not state parties to the
Rome Statute, entered into an Article 98 Agreement [hereinaf-
ter "Agreement"]. Article 98 agreements are intended to pre-
vent the Court from "proceed[ing] with a request for surrender
which would require the requested state to act inconsistently
with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to
which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a
person of that State to the Court." Rome Statute, art. 98(2).
Vineland and Katonia's Agreement provides that "persons of
one party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent
expressed consent of the first Party, (a) be surrendered or trans-
ferred by any means to the International Criminal Court for
any purpose. . .." Article 98 Agreement art 2(a),Vineland-
Katonia, August 1, 2002. In the Agreement, Katonia expressed
its intention to investigate and prosecute crimes within the ju-
risdiction of the ICC. See id., preamble.
In interpreting the role of an article 98 agreement, article
98 of the Rome Statute should be interpreted "in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose." Vienna Convention, art. 31(1) (emphasis added); see
also Rome Statute, art. 98. Thus, article 98 must necessarily be
interpreted in light of Rome Statute's objective of preventing
impunity by assuring that crimes are properly investigated and
prosecuted. Article 98 agreements can, therefore, only be valid
if Katonia promises that it will investigate and prosecute the
crimes in question. In this instance, Katonia did not explicitly
state that it would investigate and prosecute the alleged crimes
committed by the accused. In fact, Katonia's enduring silence
on this issue must be interpreted as foregoing any intention to
investigate and prosecute its accused nationals. But, since the
plain language of Article 98 does not clarify precisely how arti-
20051
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cle 98 operates, its "context" must be derived from "any instru-
ment which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty." S , art. 31(2)(b).
The United Nation's Addendum to the Rome Statute, Rule
9.19, regarding interpretation of article 98, provides that a state
party to the Rome Statute contesting jurisdiction must notify
the Court that "a request for surrender or assistance raises a
problem of execution in respect of article 98, [and] shall provide
any information relevant to assist the Court in the application
of article 98. Any concerned third State or sending State may
provide additional information to assist the Court." United Na-
tions Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. L.1/Rev.1/Add.1, at Rule 9.19 (2000). Thus, if
the Article 98 agreement truly posed a conflict with respect to
surrendering the accused to the ICC, Vineland should have no-
tified the Court prior to doing so. However, Vineland did not
notify the Court of any conflicts or provide information on the
Agreement to the Court.
Furthermore, despite the unfortunate change in political
circumstances, Vineland remains bound to its obligation to co-
operate in the surrender, investigation, and prosecution of the
accused at the ICC. It is well settled that states remain bound
to treaties even though political changes, however significant,
may have occurred. See Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Prject (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 3 (holding that
despite a change from a Soviet to a democratic government,
Hungary was still bound to a treaty dating to Soviet times).
Treaties can only be terminated when the fundamental change
of circumstances was unforeseen and the existence of the cir-
cumstances at the time of signing the treaty constituted an es-
sential basis of the parties' consent. See Vienna Convention,
art. 62.
Due to the history of continuous fighting in Vineland (R. I
1), such political change could not have been unforeseen at the
time the Rome Statute was signed. Furthermore, given that
ICC jurisdiction has positive benefits for state parties in hostile
times by ensuring that alleged criminals are appropriately in-
vestigated and prosecuted, the signing of the September 2001
peace treaty (R. 1) cannot constitute an essential basis of
Vineland's consent to the Rome Statute.
[Vol. 17:179
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B. Principles of Equity Call for ICC Jurisdiction
In furtherance of the purpose of the ICC to prevent impu-
nity, principles of equity also necessarily call for the exercise of
ICC jurisdiction. Equitable principles of law have long been
used to decide international disputes. See generally North Sea
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4 (holding that the parties should
negotiate the division of the continental shelf, taking into con-
sideration equitable principles); Meuse, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 70 (using principles of equity as a general principle of law in
treaty dispute); Cayuga Indian Claims, British and American
Claims Arbitration Tribunal, 20 Am. J. Int'l Law 574 (1926)
(holding principles of equity may be used to resolve the treaty
dispute).
The crimes committed by the accused call for a thorough
investigation and prosecution. By threatening not to partici-
pate in the UNVINE operation or other peacekeeping opera-
tions unless the Security Council granted its soldiers immunity
from ICC prosecution (R. 3), Katonia is attempting to com-
pletely escape accountability for its soldiers' actions. As a result
of Katonia and Ridgeland's ten-day aerial bombing, thousands
of acres of farmland were ruined and large quantities of crops
and livestock were destroyed. (R. 6) Personal property be-
longing to Vineland civilians was reportedly stolen during the
house-to-house raids conducted by Katonia and Ridgeland
soldiers. (R. 6) Then, on July 20, 2002, three villages were
unnecessarily destroyed, three hundred civilians were killed,
and 550 were seriously injured when Katonia and Ridgeland at-
tempted to bomb ANVA headquarters. (R. at 10)
Due to the gravity of the injury inflicted on Vineland's civil-
ians and the reluctance of Vineland, Katonia and Ridgeland to
prosecute the accused, the ICC should proceed with an investi-
gation and prosecution in order to bring justice to the thousands
of innocent victims. Furthermore, as an insurgent group, and a
contributor to continuous fighting in Vineland, ANVA courts
would not have provided the accused with a fair investigation
and trial since ANVA headquarters were the target of the
Katonia and Ridgeland bombing operations. Under such cir-
cumstances, any investigation and prosecution of the defend-
ants by ANVA's military tribunals would have necessarily been
prejudiced.
20051
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C. Proceeding with an Investigation and Prosecution
Does Not Violate the Rome Statute or the U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1234
Finally, proceeding with an investigation or prosecution of
the accused at the ICC does not violate the Resolution or the
Rome Statute. The Resolution is consistent with U.N. Security
Council powers under article 16 of the Rome Statute, and pro-
vides that the ICC may not proceed with an investigation or
prosecution for a period of twelve months "over acts or omis-
sions relating to a United Nations established or authorized op-
eration." S.C. Res. 1234, 21 (emphasis added). Article 16 of the
Rome Statute permits the Security Council to request the Court
not to commence or proceed with an investigation or prosecu-
tion of any action taken under Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations [hereinafter the "U.N. Charter"]. See Rome
Statute, art. 16.
In January 2002, the U.N. authorized the UNVINE
peacekeeping operation [hereinafter the "Operation"] in Vine-
land consisting of deploying five-hundred military personnel
and six-hundred civilian personnel to "verify cessation of hostil-
ities, to set up a security zone for civilians and refugees, and to
make preparations for the forthcoming elections in the various
regions." (R. 1 1) Katonia and Ridgeland deployed soldiers and
paratroopers to assist with the Operation. (R. 1) The crimes
committed occurred during attacks subsequent to the Opera-
tion, which were unilaterally undertaken by Katonia and Ridge-
land without U.N. authorization. Acting solely on Vineland
intelligence reports, Ridgeland and Katonia launched a ten-day
aerial attack, bombing ANVA headquarters acting. (R. 6, 10)
The crimes committed were in no way related to the UNVINE
peacekeeping operation.
Furthermore, consistent with U.N. powers under the Rome
Statute, the Resolution provides only for a twelve-month delay
in ICC prosecution, rather than pure immunity. See S.C. Res.
1234, 21; Rome Statute, art. 16. Therefore, granting the ac-
cused immunity from ICC prosecution runs contrary to the Res-
olution, destroys U.N. credibility, and defeats the purpose of the
ICC. Katonia's conduct - threatening to not participate in UN-
VINE or any other peacekeeping missions unless its soldiers are
granted immunity from ICC prosecution - should not go unpun-
[Vol. 17:179
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ished. (R. 3.) Granting Katonian soldiers immunity from ICC
prosecution weakens the effectiveness of future U.N.
peacekeeping operations because other countries will seek simi-
lar immunities from prosecution by threatening to veto
peacekeeping operations. Setting this type of precedent effec-
tively destroys the credibility of the U.N. Security Council and
future international peacekeeping operations.
Accordingly, investigating and prosecuting the accused at
the ICC is the only means through which the objectives of the
ICC can be advanced. Failure to do so will contravene the very
purpose of the Rome Statute and will undermine the credibility
of the ICC, the U.N. and the stability of the international
system.
II. DEFENDANTS HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES WHICH
VIOLATE THE ROME STATUTE AND SHOULD BE
PROSECUTED ACCORDINGLY
The Defendants have subjected the people of Vineland to
horrific acts of violence, including a lengthy aerial bombing and
the unlawful detention of civilians without any procedural safe-
guards to ensure that innocent, non-insurgent detainees are re-
leased, wantonly destroyed the lives and property of innocent
civilians. (R. 6) The Defendants' actions clearly violate cus-
tomary norms of international law as well as specific provisions
of the Rome Statute. The ICC should move forward with the
prosecution of these Defendants so that they can be punished
for their crimes. This is an opportunity for the ICC to set a pre-
cedent that peacekeeping forces are bound by the dictates of in-
ternational law, in order to ensure that such forces do indeed
help bring peace to conflict-ridden regions around the globe.
A. Defendant Pilots Have Committed War Crimes in
Violation of Article 8 of the Rome Statute by
Conducting a Bombing Campaign Which Failed
to Distinguish Between Military and Civilian
Objectives
Defendants' ten-day aerial bombing reprisal campaign con-
stituted an attack against civilians and amounted to a war
crime in violation of international law, specifically article 8 of
the Rome Statute. Under principles of international law, par-
2005]
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ties to a conflict must distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants. The International Court of Justice has identified
this requirement as one of the "cardinal principles contained in
the texts constituting the fabric of humanitarian law." Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 78.
Furthermore, the Rome Statute specifically criminalizes at-
tacks against civilians, providing that the "Court shall have ju-
risdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when
committed as part of a plan or policy of a large-scale commission
of such crimes." Rome Statute, art. 8(1). Attacks against civil-
ian populations are forbidden both in conflicts that are of inter-
national character and those that are not. See Rome Statute,
arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(e)(i). Accordingly, it is not necessary at this
juncture to characterize the nature of the conflict in which the
actions in question occurred. It is sufficient to note that under
either characterization, the Defendants have violated the terms
of the Rome Statute.
Articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i) of the Rome Statute define
the war crime of attacking civilians. Pursuant to article 9, the
Court has promulgated an "Elements of Crimes" addendum to
the Rome Statute to assist with the interpretation of articles 6,
7, and 8. The addendum provides five elements which help to
define the crime of attacking civilians, with four of those ele-
ments being common to both articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i).
The common elements include:
1. the perpetrator directed an attack;
2. the object of the attack was a civilian population as such or
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
3. the perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or in-
dividual civilians not taking part in hostilities to be the object
of the attack;
4. the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that estab-
lished the existence of an armed conflict.
Rome Statute, arts. 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(e)(i) (describing the "Ele-
ments of the Crime").
Element 4 is the only Element that is not common to definitions
found in articles 8(2)(b)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i). In article 8(2)(b)(i), El-
ement Four provides that the "conduct took place in the context
of and was associated with an international armed conflict."
Rome Statute, art. 8(2)(b)(i). In article 8(2)(e)(i), however, Ele-
[Vol. 17:179
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ment 4 dictates that the "conduct took place in the context of
and was associated with an armed conflict not of an interna-
tional character." Accordingly, the crime of attacking civilians
applies uniformly regardless of whether the conflict was of an
international character or not.
There can be no question that Elements 1 and 5 have been
satisfied by Defendants' aerial bombing campaigns. Defend-
ants' attack targeted a civilian population, resulting in the
death and injury of an unknown number of civilians, as well as
extensive damage to civilian property, crops, and livestock. "At-
tack" is defined in article 49 of Additional Protocol 1 to the Ge-
neva Convention as "acts of violence against the adversary,
whether in offense or in defense." In this case, a bombing cam-
paign would most certainly qualify as an "act of violence." Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Additional Protocol 1, art. 49(1), Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Furthermore, Defendants were
most certainly aware of the existence of an armed conflict as
their conduct occurred as part of a reprisal campaign in re-
sponse to an armed attack against their own soldiers.
Element 2 has likewise been satisfied by Defendants' ac-
tions. "A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the
categories of persons referred to in Article 4(A)(1), (2), (3), and
(6) of the Third Geneva Convention and in Article 43 of [the]
Additional Protocol." Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No.
IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ICTY Appeals Chamber, 48 (Dec. 17,
2004); see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War III art. 4(A)(1), (2), (3), (6) Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Additional Protocol 1, art. 43, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75
U.N.T.S. 135. Furthermore, if there is any doubt as to whether
an individual is a civilian, that person "shall be considered a
civilian." Id. Article 4(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention applies to
insurgent groups including:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own terri-
tory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias
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or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance move-
ments, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War III art. 4(A)(2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
Therefore, members of insurgency movements cannot claim ci-
vilian status if they fall within the above definition. See Kordic,
IT-95-14/2-A at 50. "The civilian population comprises all per-
sons who are civilians and the presence within the civilian pop-
ulation of individuals who do not come within the definition of
civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian charac-
ter." Id.
Accordingly, although the Defendants may have suspected
the existence of insurgent fighters hidden among the civilian
population, they cannot indiscriminately attack the civilian
population as a whole in the hope of killing some insurgents.
The women and children killed most certainly did not fall
within the above definition. Furthermore, the unexploded
bombs that now litter the terrain of the northern region of Vine-
land will indiscriminately maim and kill any individual that is
unfortunate enough to be within the vicinity when they explode.
International law prohibits nations from using weapons that
fail to distinguish between civilians and military targets. See
generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
1996 I.C.J. 226. As noted above, international law places an ab-
solute restriction on attacking civilians as civilians can never be
a legitimate target, despite the growing complexities of fighting
an insurgency.
The Defendants' bombing also satisfies Element 3 of the
war crime of attacking civilians in that the civilian population
was the object of Defendants' attack. Article 30 of the Rome
Statute states: "luinless otherwise provided, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime
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within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material ele-
ments are committed with intent and knowledge." Rome Stat-
ute, art. 30(1). Under article 30, the "intent" requirement is
satisfied if a person means to engage in the conduct and when
that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it
will occur in the ordinary course of events. See Rome Statute,
art. 30(2). The "knowledge" requirement is satisfied when the
defendant is aware that a "circumstance exists or a consequence
will occur in the ordinary course of events." Rome Statute, art.
30(3).
In response to the attack against peacekeeping forces,
Katonia and Ridgeland bombed the general area of the attacks.
They did not limit their bombing to known and legitimate mili-
tary targets. The ten-day aerial campaign was designed to af-
fect civilian populations and, therefore, meets the intent
requirement. Even if the Defendants did not plan to attack ci-
vilians, they had to be aware that a general area bombing cam-
paign would result in the victimization of the civilians.
Furthermore, the Defendants had the requisite knowledge that
a civilian population existed in the areas that they chose to
bomb indiscriminately.
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants should be
held criminally responsible for war crimes in violation of article
8 of the Rome Statute for the bombing campaigns, which victim-
ized civilians and failed to distinguish the civilian populous
from military targets.
B. Defendant Military Police Officers Have Committed
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in
Violation of Article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute
by Indiscriminately Detaining Civilians
Without Adequate Procedural Safeguards
The Defendant military police officers' unlawful detain-
ment of males from the conflict zone constitutes a crime against
humanity in violation of article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute. In
their reprisal campaign, paratroopers from Katonia and Ridge-
land conducted house-to-house searches and detained several
men and boys for observation to determine whether they were
insurgents. These actions cannot be justified under interna-
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tional law and, therefore, the Defendants should be held crimi-
nally responsible for this conduct.
Article 7(1)(e) criminalizes, as a crime against humanity,
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty.
The Elements of Crimes addendum to the Rome Statute charac-
terizes the crime as one with five elements:
1. the perpetrator imprisoned one or more persons or otherwise
severely deprived one or more persons of physical liberty;
2. the gravity of the conduct was such that it was in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
3. the perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established the gravity of the conduct;
4. the conduct was committed as part of a widespread or system-
atic attack directed against a civilian population;
5. the perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended
the conduct to be part of a widespread or systematic attack di-
rected against a civilian population.
Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(e).
There is no question that Defendants' conduct satisfied Ele-
ment 1 of the above definition. Likewise, the satisfaction of Ele-
ments 4 and 5 has been established above in Section II(A). As
such, since Elements 2 and 3 can also be established, the De-
fendants can be held criminally culpable for their unlawful de-
tainment of civilians in connection with their reprisal campaign
in the northern region of Vineland.
The Defendants' conduct violates fundamental rules of in-
ternational law. International law provides that, "the confine-
ment of civilians during armed conflict may be permissible in
limited cases, but will be unlawful if the detaining party does
not comply with the provisions of article 42 of the Geneva Con-
vention IV." Kordic, IT-95-14/2-A at 69; see also Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War IV art. 42, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
Article 42 provides that, "the internment or placing in assigned
residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the secur-
ity of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary." See
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War IV art. 42, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75
U.N.T.S. 135; see also Kordic, IT-95-14/2-A at 69. Further, ar-
ticle 43 of the Geneva Convention IV provides that, "[a]ny pro-
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tected person who has been interned or placed in assigned
residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as
soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative
board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose." See
id. art 43; see also Kordic, IT-95-14/2-A at 70. International
courts have interpreted articles 42 and 43 to provide that, al-
though an initial detainment may be lawful, the internment
"clearly becomes unlawful if the detaining party does not re-
spect the basic procedural rights of the detained persons and
does not establish an appropriate court or administrative board
as prescribed in Article 43 of Geneva Convention IV." Kordic,
IT-95-14/2-A at 70.
The Defendants' conduct clearly violates these established
principles of international law. Defendants cannot justify the
internment of all male members of a society as a measure "abso-
lutely necessary" to the security of their forces. There are
surely less restrictive means of ensuring security, such as, es-
tablishing a police force to patrol civilian areas and conducting
intelligence operations to clearly identify the insurgents embed-
ded within the civilian population. Further, even if the Defend-
ants establish that the detainment of civilians was necessary
for security purposes, it still violates international principles
since there is no evidence that Defendants implemented any
procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the detainees. The
detainees were not reviewed by any administrative board, but
rather, observed indefinitely to determine if they were truly a
threat to the security of Katonia and Ridgeland.
Similarly, Element 3 of the crime of unlawful detainment is
satisfied in that the Defendants were aware of the factual cir-
cumstances that established the gravity of the conduct. Defend-
ants knew, or should have known, that, by detaining
individuals without any evidence of their insurgency member-
ship, some non-insurgent innocent civilians would be unjustifi-
ably held. This is not a case of mistaking certain individuals as
members of ANVA, but rather a case of instituting a policy that
failed to discriminate between members of ANVA and innocent
civilians.
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants should be
held criminally responsible under article 7(1)(e) of the Rome
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Statute for the crime against humanity of imprisonment or
other severe deprivation of physical liberty.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the International Criminal
Court should exercise jurisdiction over the accused. Further,
the ICC should hold the Defendants criminally responsible for
attacking civilians, a war crime in violation of article 8 of the
Rome Statute, and for imprisoning or otherwise severely de-
priving civilians of physical liberty, a crime against humanity
under article 7(1)(e) of the Rome Statute.
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